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Medical Data and Applied Ethics · 
Part II* 
The Sources of Data 
Edmond A. Murphy, M.D., Sc.D. 
In exploring the second of our 
. problems - the analysis of the sources 
·of information - it will be necessary 
to brush -aside all the semantic diffi-
culties considered previously. To 
illustrate certain principles about the 
sources of data and how they operate, 
it will be necessary to pretend that 
there are no epistemological difficult-
ies over the use of such words as 
"cancer", or "disease". 
It will also, I hope, be evident that 
the kinds of difficulties connected 
with determining the facts about 
disease, apply equally to what has 
*PaTt I was printed in the August, 
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been . discovered about psych< 1gy, 
education or moral problems b the 
same method of inference. It is < the 
first importance to realize that •ese 
rules apply to all knowledge defr ded 
on empirical grounds alone. 
It must not be supposed tha. 1ny 
exclusive claims are being made f, the 
value or the cogency of scie ific 
evidence. There are doubtless .my 
other channels through which 1· ) W-
ledge can be attained. But the 
epistemological defense for the sc .nd-
ness of a conclusion must rest squ -ely 
in some field. A painter might dim 
that Rembrandt was a great ·tist 
because of his development of 
chiaroscuro; and a political tht ~ r ist 
might claim he was a great ·tist 
because of his recognition of the 
dignity of the common man. · o a 
scientist - in the abstract sense Jf a 
narrow specialist - both con ten, ions 
would be unintelligible, now, and 
perhaps permanently. That this "<ind 
of rigid compartmentalizing of know-
ledge does not occur in practicP re-
flects the broadmindedness of the 
specialist. But the rigorous exawjna-
tion of such a claim must be under-
taken within some scheme of criticism. 
It may be that a system of defe nse 
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could be elaborated which lay not in 
science or esthetics but at the interface 
between them; but for this to be 
possible such a system would have to 
. be developed in its own right. 
. Suppose that some pastoral theo-
logian expresses some opinion about, 
let us say, the effects of Catholic 
education or the dangers of ·mixed 
marriages. Insofar as his opinion 
depends on , for example, infused 
knowledge or on some deductions 
from a scriptural source , then he will 
meet no criticism from me and I must 
leave it to his peers to decide whether 
his conclusions are sound. But if he 
claims that his conclusion is based on 
scientific inference from experience, 
th~n in its empirical mode his con-
clusion must be subject to the kinds of 
discipline discussed here. I do not 
deny (neither do I affirm) that certain 
men of great holiness or percipience 
can arrive at pastoral wisdom which 
transcends the scientifically imperfect 
sources of their information. But such 
arguments leave me a little nervous if 
for no other reason then that formal 
demonstration of the truth of these 
conclusions is wanting. It has been a 
common belief within the medical 
profession that an analgous kind of 
transcendental wisdom can be attained 
in clinical matters. But where formal 
scientific studies have subsequently 
been performed, the beliefs arrived at 
by this method have distressingly 
often proved false . I hope it will not 
be thought an unduly hostile comment 
to say that most , perhaps all, of the 
experience and the pastoral wisdom 
which the Church has built up over the 
ages, viewed · strictly as scientific 
evidence is almost all unsound. 
The cardinal problem which besets 
the scientist who wishes to establish 
demonstrable truth, arises from the 
inductive nature of his discipline. The 
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sCientist capitalizes on the fact that 
there is some, not necessarily perfect, 
uniformity in the behavior of sensible 
phenomena. In principle all the facts 
that he needs to know can be found 
by direct observation except, of 
course, those facts which are beyond 
the resolving power of the available 
means of observation~ An engineer 
wishing to decide whether a particular 
design of bridge will stand up or fall 
· down, can always build it and see. But, 
apart from the expense and the danger 
of this method, any self-respecting 
engineer would view it with pro-
fessional dissatisfaction; he would feel 
that such an approach does not do 
justice to the extent of the organiza-
tion in the theoretiCal aspects of his 
field. Now clearly any alternative to 
this "try-it-and-see" approach implies 
a belief that natural phenomenon · can 
be described in terms which are less 
numerous than the facts collected i.e. -
data can be reduced. This belief 
cannot be demonstrated, though it 
seems evident that if it were false, 
policies predicated on it would lead, 
sooner or later, to failure. But if this 
belief be granted, the recognition of 
truth in any particular field by em-
pirical means is based on two con-
ditions: -
1) That there be sufficient experi-:-
ence in the field; and 
2) That what experience there is, be 
representative. 
The violation of these principles 
leads on the one hand to problems of 
sampling error, and on the other hand 
to problems of bias. The two are not 
mutually exClusive in that they may 
coexist, but they differ fundamentally. 
The difference can perhaps be best 









Example I. A surgeon after per-
forming some new and elaborate 
operation successfully three times 
might be led to claim that the mortal-
ity rate is zero and that the operation 
is without risk to life. Now one needs 
no sophisticated scientific training to 
recognize that such a · claim is 
excessive. Even - assuming that the 
surgeon has not selected his patients, it 
may well be that just by change he has 
each time picked patients with a good 
operative risk. His sample by common 
consent is too small for such a confi-
dent generalization. The only remedy 
is a more extensive experience. In his 
further cases; of course, the surgeon 
may go on being lucky. But the larger 
his experience the less likely it is that 
· his success is attributable to good luck 
alone. There is always some possibility 
of this explanation; but with large 
numbers and uniform success, the 
reasonable interpretation would be 
that the risk is in fact small. Formal 
exploration of this point by statistical 
theory sustains the conclusions of 
common sense. 
However, it is important not to get 
carried away in one's criticism. A 
commonplac-e comment is that, "You 
can tell nothing from three cases". 
This is manifest nonsense. However 
uncertain conclusions based on such a 
limited experience, any data are a vast 
-improvement on none at all. It is 
nonetheless true that the uncertainties 
associated with sampling can be pro-
gressively attenuated by increasing the 
size of the sample. 
Example II. Now by contrast, 
consider the therapeutic nihilist - an 
internist perhaps - who is convinced 
that some common operation is ex-
tremely dangerous. Since he does not 
have direct access to the surgeon's 
patients, he arranges with a pathologist 
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to be notified every time one of th se 
patients, ·who underwent the opt= ·a-
tion, comes to autopsy. On the b: .tis 
of the information obtained from t 1is 
source he proposes to asses the risk ~ of 
the operation. It is surely obvious t at 
all those coming to autopsy are de !d; 
and since the nihilist gains no ·x-
perience of any other kind of case , he 
concludes that the mortality rate is 
100%. 
(Of course, if his informant l ad 
been the administrator who arra . ;es 
for taxis to transport the pati nt 
home, then he would be aware onl) of 
the patients who survive; and hew tld 
conclude that the mortality ratr is 
zero percent.) 
Such methods of ascertainment , J<e 
the observations from small samr es, 
also lead to erroneoqs conclusions, ~ ut 
for quite different reasons. Here tl !re 
is a systematic error in the selectior of 
cases, one which large numbers wil · do 
nothing to correct. Mortality r tes 
based on 10,000 patients coming, to 
autopsy will be just as erroneou~ as 
those based on three patients o: ly, 
and for precisely the same rea~ Jn. 
Such a systematic error is calle. a 
bias. The basic fault is that the san le 
on which the conclusions are b~ ing 
based is not representative of the 
population about which the general za-
tion is being made. It may be accid, nt-
ally true that the autopsy patients are 
representative because it may be at 
the particular operation is invari<.qly 
fatal. But this will rarely be true md 
the whole point at issue is whe her 
such is the case or not. 
This problem of obtaining re re-
sentative (as distinct from adequately 
large) samples must be rriet by exact 
ideas and methods. To decide the fate 
of patients undergoing operation A, at 
a particular hospital* it would be 
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to consider all those ad-
mitted or some kind of a systematical-
ly. collected sampfe of them. If the 
mortality rate is 10% then for every 
case going to the morgue, nine will be 
discharged eventually: and the 
sampling procedure should reflect 
these proportions. The investigator 
cannot simply collect his data in a 
hap-hazard way and hope that the 
proportions will come out right. 
How a sampling method is best used 
in an individual case is a complicated 
subject (1 ,2) which could not possibly 
be dealt with here even in outline. The 
points that matter are to be aware of 
the importance of representativeness 
and to recognize that non-representa-
tiveness (or bias) is not cured by 
taking a large sample; the statistician 
may be able to adjust for the effects of 
bias if the nature of the bias is known. 
But there are many cases which cannot 
be cured by any analytical finesse. 
someone trying to make a balanced 
judgment, the theologian could hardly 
dismiss this possibility out of hand -
then the means of collecting infor-
mation will be silent on the point. 
Graham Greene has made the point 
well. 
" ... A priest only knows the unimportant 
things". 
"Unimportant"? 
"Oh, I mean the sins", he said impatiently. 
"A man doesn't come to us and confess his 
virtues". (3) 
The collection of information in the 
confessional is closely allied to that of 
the nihilist who is opposed to the 
surgical operation. The only informa-
tion obtained at all is to the detriment 
of the garment and the defect is not 
remedied by collecting a vast amount 
of information. The experiences of 
fifty pastors hearing confessions will 
merely be the bias of one magnified 
fifty times. 
The second line of information 
might be those who come to consult 
the priest outside the confessional. 
This source would be perhaps a little 
better since it is not quite so closely 
concerned with sin ; but the improve-
ment would be only slight. A priest in 
such a situation might build up an 
extensive experience; but it would be 
an extensive experience of certain 
kinds of person. There is no reas_on to 
suppose them representative and 
indeed a good deal of reason to 
suppose the contrary. 
Much of this, .of course, does not 
matter. In the difficult area of purity 
the usual practice has been to treat 
penitents individually, recognizing that 
what may be quite harmless to one -
may not be to another. Yet the prob-
lem of modesty in dress (which does 
not involve one person only) cannot 
To bring all this a little closer to 
home, let us apply it to a hypothetical 
pastoral example. Suppose that the 
pastoral theologian wanted _ to express 
an opinion as to whether the miniskirt 
is a scandalous garment. He could , of 
course' base his opinion on his own 
individual reactions. But generally , I 
think his opinion would be formed in 
the light of what the average person's 
reaction was. Now how would he get 
information about the reactions of the 
average person? The confessional 
would be a poor source. The matter 
will be raised in the confessional for 
the most part by people to whom it 
has been either an occasion or a source 
of sin. Such people may represent a 
small proportion of the population 
only. If such a garment were a source 
of virtue to some , perhaps large , 
segme~t of the population - and as 
*There is, of course, no reason for supposing that the e~perience 'in this hospital is 
representative of that in hospitals generally. 
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be dealt with in these terms. And, at 
least in the past, there has been an 
almost total disregard for this principle 
of individuality in the censorship of 
films and books. In neither case, to my 
knowledge, has there ever been any 
pretence of consulting representative 
members of the laity before passing 
judgment. 
The next phase of the problem arises 
out of this very notion of individual-
ism. However necessary it may be to 
"tailor-make" spiritual direction in 
practice, it would be unmanageable in 
theory. If books on morals are to be 
written at all, then I suppose that they 
must contain broad principles. 
But a generalization always involves 
some distortion of the truth and in 
general, the more extensive if is the 
greater the distortion. The statement, 
"University professors are highly edu-
cated people", is only roughly true: 
there are exceptions. But in the 
generalization "Most white-collar 
workers are moderatley well educa-
ted", the exceptions are more numer-
ous and differ more widely from the 
average state. The second generaliza-
tion of course deals with a larger and, 
necessarily, more heterogeneous group 
of people. 
Thus the objectives of generality 
(simplicity) and accuracy are in con-
flict; conditions which favor the one 
a.re inimical to the other. In the nature 
of things a compromise is necessary. 
Grouping or "stratification" may be 
used in an attempt to produce groups 
which are more or less homogeneous 
and yet large enough to avoid those 
problems arising from small samples 
considered earlier. They should be 
numerous enough for the generaliza-
tions to be reasonably accurate, and 
yet not so numerous as to make it 
difficult to detect any broa( rer-all 
trends. 
For example, the preval\ 
coronary disease are not the 
all ages. A common practi 
compute prevalences in 
grouped by age at intervals o 
ten years. This arrangement n• 
requirements pretty well; and 
of sufficient simplicity to all< 
general statements as that tht 
is rare before the age of 30 , 
the prevalence increases stead. 
age. Both these facts would c 
have been missed if prevale1 
been computed without regan : 
and if no grouping had been er. 
at all, but individual patients c 
been studied, the relationship 
would · be much more diffi 
appreciate by inspection espec 
view of the fact that the nun; 
persons at risk also changes v. 
Again, I am sure pastoral ar 
to this heterogeneity of behav 
.leap to mind. Men's moral p1 
are different from womens', ch: 
from adults' and longshoremen 
those of professors of de 
theology. In particular, if one 
in the light of scientific critieria 
down broad principles of C\ 
deduced from ~mpirical data, t 
would be necessary to collect in 
tion in such a way that by anal~ 
risk for each group, and eve 
each patient*, could be deter 
separately. 



































A common statement is to the . .ffect 
that "you can prove anything. with 
statistics:" and the claim is ; und 
provided that what has been prc·ved is 
capable of statistical exploratio 1 and 
also of course, provided that it i\ true. 
*There are elaborate statistical methods which allow risk to be assessed without gro:Jping. 
(4,5) 
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the implication that one can prove 
which are untrue can only be 
d on prejudice or on having ex-
rienced the results of the perversion · 
statistical method. Probably the 
mmonest perversion is the misuse of 
ralizations about heterogeneous 
ulations. This is not to say that no 
a.em!ralli'J ~ations are possible in such 
. But they are apt to be brittle . 
For example, official · figures may 
that the prevalence · of lung 
cer in country A is 2%. This may 
a sound figure , and from certain 
dpoints, a useful one. A health 
llaldn1inist1rator in deciding how ex-
the provision which must be 
for the problems of lung cancer 
would find such information useful. 
country B, on the other hand, 
prevalence may be 4% and this 
-,:::~ ... -~ will also be of value to the 
• aldrrtini.stration. 
But to push these figures futher is to 
danger. The propagandist in 
-~·~··~ ...... A, either through stupidity or 
- ...... ,~"·""sty, may attempt to prove , by 
. ,:onlp::trir:tg these figures, that A is a 
.,.,~aJLuu.~~ country to live in than B. But 
may be that there are more elderly 
• t>eoole in country B; and since cancer 
affects older rather than younger 
patients, it is hardly to be wondered at 
that lung cancer is also more common. 
would be the case even if the two 
countries did not differ from each 
r in any other respect whatsoever 
than age composition. 
But there is more to it than that. 
The question arises as to why people 
·country B should be older; and 
are all sorts of possible reasons. 
may be that the younger people in 
country B are moving to country A, 
thus changing the composition of the 
two populations. It may be that A has 
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a bigger birthrate than B. But it may 
even be that B is a less healthy country 
than A and that more people are dying 
young from other diseases; in conse-
quence they do not live long enough 
to acquire cancer. 
It must be obvious that no useful 
conclusions can be arrived at about the 
healthiness of the two countries unless 
one of two conditions is met: -
1} The two populations are identi-
cal in all other respects 
or 
2) Extraneous differences have been 
allowed for. 
Even where this requirement has 
been met the scientist can rarely know 
it or can even be fairly sure. The 
exception is where in a deliberate 
study · he has randomly assigqed 
members from the same population to 
the two "subpopulations" A and B 
and thereafter has introduced the 
difference of interest between the two 
experimental groups. 
Now, to revert to the problem of 
cancer rates in the two populations, if 
there is a free system of emigration, A 
and B are · more-or-less self-selected 
populations: there is no reason to 
believe that they are equivalent to 
random assignations and good grounds 
to believe the contrary. 
Those who emigrate from B to A 
may be the more ambitious and intelli-
gent, and theref9re likely to be 
successful. In consequence of both 
intelligence and prosperity, they may 
maintain better standards of personal 
hygiene and thus have a lower risk of 
cancer. But this is not a reflection of 
the environment of country A, merely 
of the fruits of intelligence and wealth; 
and the prevalence of cancer might be 





For this reason the analysis of 
spontaneously formed groups is always 
more treacherous) and-the conclusions 
arrived at surrounded by much more 
uncertainty, . than for experimental 
studies of subjects who have been 
deliberately grouped in accordance 
with some systematic scheme of 
allocation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
What are the important lessons from 
all this? 
First, in any <::xercise in empirical 
inference, it is ne ,;:;essary to defme the 
. population of interest. This must be 
done explicitly and before the event . 
Deciding on the population of interest 
after the data have been inspected, 
creates problems of the logic of infer-
ence which cannot be discussed here. 
Secondly, where only part of the 
population is studied, the random 
sampling procedure must be carefully 
and expliCitly thought out. The word 
"random" has a precise technical 
meaning - for in~;tance it implies that 
before the sample has been selected 
the probability of any one person 
being included is specified. Anything 
less must be labelled "haphazard" and 
cannot be used as the basis for any 
~ound non-trivial scientific inference. 
Certain trivial inferences can be 
made. A physician in practice, deriving 
his patients from an unspecified 
source, who sees :l patient with hyper-
nephroma in country C, can thereafter 
claim that this car.cer is "not unknown 
in C". Or a priest may know from the 
confessional, th~.t drinking vinegar 
may excite somf people to simony 
because he had encountered such a 
case. But if the :tepresentativeness of 
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the samples . is unknown no ~ful 
conclusions about frequencies are 
possible. 
Thirdly, in comparing two po' ula-
tions, account must be taken of any 
extraneous differences. Thus, i• we 
wish to explore the effect of smc' :ing 
on lung cancer by comparing po ula- · 
tions A and B, then adjustment mst 
be made for all pertinent differe tees 
between A and Bother than their s1 ok-
ing habits. Of course in any real s :ua-
tion it is not known what diffen ces 
are petinent. In consequence logi 1lly 
certain or compelling conclusion ~ are 
not possible and all results of this ind 
must be accepted with reservat ns. 
This logical difficulty can be cift 1m-
vented if the two populations ca be 
assigned randomly from the f tme 
population. But in many , per aps 
most, situations either for moral, ] al, 
political or logistic reasons it is ot 
possible to do so , and the scie tist 
must needs have recourse to se(. md 
class evidence. But the exiger ;ies 
arising from the system should r :ver 
lead one to represent the scier ific 
soundness of that evidence availab :; as 
better than it is. 
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Part III 
The Interpretation of Evidence 
· In this third and last discussion 
attention will be centered on the 
interpretation of data. To some slight 
extent, this matter has been discussed 
in the second paper of the series. But 
the motivation is different. Compari-
son of cancer rates in countries A and 
8 was used as an illustration of the 
importance of defming the population 
and specifying the sampling procedure. 
But in this paper we will assume not 
only that there are no semantic and 
ontological difficulties but also that 
the sources of the data are beyond 
reproach. We st ill have the further 
problem of how we are to interpret 
what we have found. The subject is a 
vast one; but by way of illustration we 
shal) consider two major sources of 
difficulty and error - on the one hand 
confounqing, on the other correlation 
and the" implications it has for 
causation. 
CONFOUNDING 
Suppose some new drug for the 
treatment of rheumatoid arthritis has 
been introduced. We give it to some 
patient with the disease and twenty-
four hours later he feels better and has · 
less pain; his fever has abated; object-
ive measurements show that he has 
appreciably greater mobility in his 
joints and certain abnormal blood tests 
are more nearly normal. The unwary 
might be led to conclude that this is a 
triumphant demonstration of the 
therapeutic value of the drug; and they 
would be more than ever convinced if 
this experience was repeated in say 14 
out of the first 20 patients on whom 
the drug was tried. 
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But this conclusion is logically un-
sound. Suppose we consider another 
more transparent example . To a group 
. of 50 normal adult people we admin-
ister 50 mg of Vitamin C at 11 p.m. 
and 45 of them have a sound night~s 
sleep. This proves that Vitamin C is a 
successful hypnotiC in most cases. The 
fallacy in this conclusion is, needless 
to say, that most of the 50 people 
would have had a sound night~s sleep 
anyway, and for all we know the 
preparation might be completely inert. 
The example demonstrates what 
should be our watchword in all such 
cases. 
Do we know what would have 
happened if the treatment had not 
been given? 
If so , does what has happened on 
treatment differ from what happens in 
the spontaneous course of the disease? 
It comes as something of a surprise to 
most lay ·people and to many doctors 
to fmd that in few cases can we answer 
these questions with any accuracy. At 
least two major difficulties exist. First, 
readers of textbooks commonly have 
concealed from them just how little 
hard fact there is about the natural 
history of disease and the factors 
which modify it·: this is true even for 
common diseases. A second and more 
insidious matter is that the very exist-
ence of an effective treatment 
modifies the kind of patient who 
comes to the doctor's attention. It is a 
general (and not unexpected) truth 
that doctors are more likely to be on 
the alert for diseases which can be 











Tuberculosis for instance offers the 
best chance of cure with the minimum 
of scarring if diagnosis and treatment 
are early. But it is also known that 
most tuberculous infections, if left to 
themselves, will heal spontaneously. 
Thus by treating early, many patients 
the physician is treating would have 
recovered in any case. By diagnosing 
late, the physician is recognizing those 
cases who have not healed spontane-
ously and are unlikely to do so. Thus 
the two kinds of patients are not 
comparable. If the duration of survival 
is to be the criterion, of cour~e, a more 
subtle bias is at work. Other things 
being equal if diagnosis is made six 
months earlier, then survival from 
diagnosis will be :;ix months longer. 
In the face of all this, could we say 
what would have happened to the 
patients with rheumatoid arthritis if 
they had not received the. new treat-
ment? Have we any evidence that what 
we have observe(. is not a spontaneous 
remission? The logical structure of the 
experiment is su;h that the effects of 
the drug cannot be distinguished from 
spontaneous changes in the disease. 
This relationship is a special case of 
confounding of effects. The word is of 
course cognate with "confusion" and 
the statement is equivalent to saying 
that two sets of effects are confused 
one with another: they are "poured 
together" like whiskey and soda. With-
out information from outside sources 
it is logically impossible to tell 
whether the whi~ :key or the soda is the 
intoxicating ingn dient. 
It is generally the case that in a 
study, one variable is of interest while 
the other variables are "contaminat-
ing" or "nuisance" variables. For the 
most part, confounding is difficult to 
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avoid and considerable ingenuit · md 
p~rceptiveness may be requir~ to 
crrcumvent it. A few instance ~. Jay 
make it clear. 
1) Injections of compound X r1 eve 
asthmatic attacks and this may e a 
property of X. But it may not l~he 
physical ,process of sticking a nee ~ in 
a patient may have this effect ; c the 
physician, . by his manner, rna · in-
fluence patients by suggestion; : it 
may be the solution in . which . is 
dissolved which is the active part. ,ere 
there are at least three variables on-
founded with the variable of int est, 
(compound X). 
2) A patient with rheum id 
arthritis is instructed to take wo 
drugs: X before breakfast andY , ter. 
The treatment is only moder ely 
effective. After one month the 
physician reverses the order in v ich 
the drugs are to be taken an( the 
benefit is greatly increased. rhe 
change may be spontaneous md 
nothing to do with either regim< of 
treatment; or remission may ave 
occurred because Y is being : ven 
early ; or X late; or both; or it m< ' be 
that X is what really is producini the 
effect but it must in some wa be 
protected by the prior action c Y. 
Here at least four effects are } ~ing 
confounded. 
3) Surgeon M treats his pati. . ts' 
peptic ulcers by gastrectomy, whr :eas 
surgeon N treats them by comb ed 
gastrojejunostomy and vagotom} M 
gets the better results. But this .. oes 
not necessarily mean that gastrect )my 
is the better operation. Perhaps ;A is 
the better surgeon. Perhaps N has 
referred to him the more seriousi v ill 
patients; it is maybe that N prefeJ -s to 
do the less radical operation and does 
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gastrectomies only in those patients in · 
whom the lesser operation fails; or the 
hospital in which N works may be less 
well equipped and staffed; or N may 
take mainly patients of some special 
racial group , or social group, or a 
religious group who do not approve of 
blood transfusion. 
4) As an illustration of the · perti-
nence of this phenomenon in other 
fields, we might consider again the 
effects of Catholic education. Suppose 
it could be shown that the lapse rate is 
lower among the alumni than in those 
attending undenominational schools. 
Superficially it might appear that this 
demonstrates that Catholic education 
is safer. But what kind of people 
attend Catholic schools? Inasmuch as 
the general teaching of the Church has 
been that Catholic education if not 
compulsary is at least warmly recom-
mended, the parents who are more 
loyal and more respectful of authority 
will tend to send their children to 
Catholic schools. So will more prosper-
ous parents. Moreover, it may be that 
the future careers of the alumni may 
be different because , in some countries 
at least, there has been more emphasis 
on the humanities and less on the 
sciences in Catholic schools. There are 
thus several sources of confounding: 
sufficient, in my opinion, to make the 
whole inference , from the empirical 
standpoint, doubtful unless at the very 
least , suitable adjustments can be 
made for these distortions. 
What can be d one about 
confounding? 
· Perhaps the most important step is 
to be aware of the phenomenon and to 
bear it continually in mind. The 
watchword must alway be , "Is there 
any factor other than the one in which 
we are interested which could account 
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for the effect which has been ob-
served?" Alternative explanations 
however implausible, must be discard~ 
ed with circumspection and, in strict 
practice, only in the light of clear 
positive evidence. 
Secondly, at least in experimental 
work, random allocation of cases to 
the various treatments should be used 
wherever possible. In default of this , 
the evidence must always be regarded 
as imperfect. 
Thirdly , except in those rare cases 
where the natural behavior of the 
disease (or whatever the phenomenon 
being studied) is well known for the 
circumstances in which the present 
study is to be conducted then a 
"control" sample should be studied. 
Thus., if we wish to find the effect of 
cortisone injections on asthmatic 
patients, we should have, simultane-
ously and under the same conditions, a · 
comparable group of asthmatics who 
receive injections of some inert prep-
aration such as the fluid in which the 
cortisone has been dissolved. Where 
possible , the asthmatics should be 
randomly assigned to the two groups; 
and for preference neither the patient 
nor the doctor assessing his progress 
should know which preparation the 
patient is receiving ("a double-blind 
experiment.") By this means con-
founding of the effects of the drug 
with the effects of suggestion can be 
largely avoided. 
Failing these niceties, adjustment 
should be made in the analysis for 
variables confounded with the main 
one , or at least such of these variables 
as are believed important. Classical 
factors which are considered are 
differences in age, sex, race, education, 
social class; occupation and stage of 
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the disease. Other factors will suggest 
themselves in the. individual case. The 
technic of aqjustment may be very 
complicated and need not concern us 
here. The main point is that such 
methods do exist; and the services of a 
competent statistician should be en-
listed where necessary. 
ASSOCIATION AND CORRELATION 
Much of inference in certain fields 
such as epidemiology depends on 
recognizing that an association exists 
between two phenomena. By an 
"association" we mean that they occur 
together more often than can be 
accounted for by chance. Thus, there 
is a positive association between tonsil-
itis and r}leumatic fever: those with 
sore throats are more likely to get 
rheumatic fever. Conversely those who 
have had vaccinia (i.e. have been 
"vaccinated") are less likely to get 
smallpox: thus there is a negative 
association between these diseases. 
Where the entities being considered 
are continuous variables, non-
independence between them is usually 
expressed as a correlation. Thus there 
is a positive cor-relation between height 
and weight. On the average, tall men 
are heavier than short men. Conversely 
the. size of the heart is negatively 
correlated with expectation of life: on 
the average' the larger the heart the 
worse the prognosis. Note that these 
statements refer to averages only .and 
are highly fallible in the individual 
cases. 
The actual technics by which signifi-
cant associations and correlations are 
demonstrated are beside the point. 
What is important is their interpreta-
tion. All the above examples quoted 
have been fairly well worked out. But 
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it will be illuminating to consider 
examples in which the nature of the 
relationship is in doubt. 
It has been repeatedly shown that if 
a group of men age , say, 40 to 60, wh 
have had a coronary thombosis, be 
compared with a group of similar mer; 
of the same age, they have on tht. 
average a higher blood cholestero; 
level. This association can be interpret 
ed according to three classes o; 
·theories. · 
1) A high serum cholesterol (C 
promotes the development of throm 
bosis (T) or perhaps of the arteria 
disease which gives rise to it. To tes 
this kind of theory we could explon 
whether C was present before t. 
2) Coronary thrombosis cause ; 
certain body reaction among whicJ 
high blood cholesterol is one, much a ; 
pneumonia causes a fever. 
3) Finally we could argue that bot] 
C and T are separate consequences 
some other unspecified factor. Fo 
instance it might be that the kind o · 
person who gets coronary disease als< • 
has high cholesterol. There is reason t<; 
believe that emotional stress affect ; 
both; so, probably, does social class; s' > 
does exercise. 
Now logically there is nothing tn 
choose between these three and I· 
personally am not convinced in the 
case of coronary disease and bloo 
cho-lesterol, that the matter has been 
resolved though I know many 
scientists would not agree with me. 
But if we represent these · diagram-
matically denoting "A causes B" by 
"A~B" and indicating the unknow 
primordial mechanism by X then it 
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be clear that we have exhausted 
1) x~c-+T 
2) x~T-+C 
3) x1T \c 
The dimensions of the problem 
dly mounts in complexity. Three 
I.,Jtertont1er1a which have been shown to 
associated (or correlated) can be 
•• r·r ... ,.,..,.d in sixteen causal pathways; 
·phenomena in 125 ways; six in 
ly seventeen thousand. The lesson 
clearly that the interpretation of 
ch ·relationships is complex. It might 
course be that many , perhaps most , 
such schemes could not be squared 
the subsidiary evidence . But the 
means of ensuring that no plaus-
hypothesis is overlooked is to 
down all possible combinations 
consider them individually. 
It would be a mistake , however , to 
that this is the method which 
sensible scientist would use to 
the uncertainty. Something 
like this problem is dealt with by 
biochemist who is trying to de-
a metabolic pathway i.e. the 
of steps by which one com-
is converted to another. The 
questions have in common that 
deal with the order of phenorn-
related to one another ; in the one 
·it is a matter of which is the 
terior to which in time , in the other 
which is anterior etiologically . 
exactly the latter notion is to be 
rpreted philosophically I do not 
. But certain it is that the 
scientist always behaves as if "etiol-
ogy" had a perfectly definite meaning. 
If one can make . the statement 
"A-+B", then manipulating A should 
change B, but the converse is not true. 
And the classical notion of causality 
implies at least this. 
Now the biochemist in his metabolic 
problem reduces its complexity by 
fragmenting the tree and studying the 
small fragments. The man exploring 
causal pathways must needs do the 
same. The tree-drawing approach has 
the defect that it is purely static ; the 
efficient approach and indeed the only 
one which can provide cogent evidence 
on causality is of its very nature 
dynamic i.e. causality is inferred from 
watching wheter changes in A (for 
preference deliberate manipulations) 
are followed by changes in B or vice 
versa. 
Spontaneous dynamic changes 
provide more information than static , 
but they are still suspect. We would 
not argue that because , to the ob-
server, lightening preceeds thunder it-is 
the cause and. thunder the effect. 
So much of the contentions of the 
historians are, I suspect, to be traced 
to their failure to grasp the inadequacy 
of their evidence on dynamic relation-
ships which are merly spontaneous and 
not deliberately manipulated. The 
resources of the historian , like those of 
the astronomer and ' the archeologist, 
are of course limited by the nature of 
the subject. 
CONCLUSIONS 
I think perhaps I will leave it at that. 
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stated. First that there is usually an 
embarrassment of hypotheses. Second-
ly, that no sound conclusions about 
causality can be made in a static 
system. Tentative conclusions may be 
reached from studying spontaneous 
dynamic changes. But cogent con-
clusions can only be reached from 
deliberate experimental manipulations. 
The heavy emphasis on training in 
the so-called exact sciences as a pre-
liminary to biological and medical 
training has the disadvantage that it 
provides no education in dealing with 
the intricacies of biological systems. 
The hiatus arises in two ways. In the 
first place , elementary courses in 
physics and chemistry deal much more 
in fact than in method. The centi-
meter-gr-am-second system of measure-
ment which is taken for granted by the 
student, in fact represents a triumph 
of analysis · arrived at by centuries of 
grappling with the constructs of 
physics and challenged again by the 
developments of relativity. The 
student too often gains no insight into 
such reductions and is perhaps · left 
with the illusion that they are easy to 
make. In the second place, the basic 
sciences are . dealing with structurally 
very simple ideas. The physiologist 
deals, or attempts to deal , with de-
scription and analysis of the flow of 
blood in the arteries, a problem which 
the physicist views with horror. The 
· histochemist has as his objective the 
description of the chemistry of the 
cell, a matter which the organic 
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chemist would dismiss as in tracta} ly 
complex, 
A 'high level' exploration of 
problems is not necessarily a was ed 
effort , but it must be conducted in its 
own terms and in accordance with its 
own disciplines. These discipli es 
many biologists and physiciaJliS ne 1er 
. learn. In consequence they commo ly 
misconstrue the evidence presented to 
·them and take or recommend in-
correct courses of action. No physi an 
would argue that fever causes pn ~ u­
monia simply because · the two tre 
associated; and though he may t ke 
steps to cool his patient it is ot 
intended as a curative measure but ; s a 
means of alleviating a distressing . : nd 
sometimes dangerous manifestatior of 
the disease. Likewise he would lot 
recommend a low calcium diet in 
tuberculosis simply because calciur 1 is 
commonly present in tubercul JUS 
lesions. Yet a large number of phy .;ic-
ians (it seems to me on no rr· )fe 
cogent basis) treat atherosclerosis t y a 
low cholesterol diet. 
As illustrations of two comr on 
sources of erroneous inference vye I- iVe 
discussed confounding and associat Jn. 
There is some simularity bet\\ ~ en 
them; they both give rise to mul1 pie 
interpretations of results which cai be 
distinguished only (if at all) by ap >eal 
to outside information. In both C< ses, 
however , ethical or legal obstacles . nay 
preclude the critical experiment. t oth 
have their analogies in the pastor. I as 
well as in the scientific sphere. 
Abortion- Part XIV · 
RT. REV. MSGR. PAUL V. HARRINGTON, P.A., J.C.L. 
c) United States of America: 
Previously , we have considered, with 
reference to Japan and the various 
geographical sections of Europe, re-
form legislation concerning the moral 
and social problem of abortion. We 
endeavored to set forth the date 
and type of the reform legislation and 
to assess its impact particularly on the 
numbers of legal and illegal abortions, 
the relationship between the total 
numbers of abortions to . the total 
numbers of live births, the problem of 
maternal mortality and we have tried 
to evaluate the influence of the new 
legislation and its results on the citi-
zens' attitudes towards the preserva-
tion or the taking of innocent, unborn 
life. 
I) Legislative Arena: 
We must now turn our attention to 
the United States of America. 
Msgr. Ha"ington is Vice-Officialis, 
the Archdiocese of Boston. 
The current drive to change existing 
abortion statutes began in earnest in 
this country in 1966. In that year, 
Mississippi adopted a more liberal 
statute. Legislative change occurred in 
1967 in the states of Colorado, North 
Carolina and California; in 1968 in 
Georgia and Maryland and in 1969 in 
Arkansas, Kansas, New Mexico and 
Delaware. 1 
What is interesting and important to 
note is that, despite a well-coordj-
nated, well-financed, highly motivated 
and determined campaign by the 
proponents of more liberal · abortion 
laws, who incidentally had the media 
of communication - radio, television, 
newspapers, professional journals, 
popular magazines etc. at their dis-
posal and on their side - only ten 
states succeeded in four legislative 
years in changing t~eir laws. 
This fact indicates to this writer that 
there just is no tremendous ground-
swell among large numbers of peoples 
in these United States to liberalize our 
current conservative statutes. And yet, 
one of the principal arguments of the 
proponents is that the present statutes 
should be changed because so many 
citizens want change. In public dis-
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